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Abstract 
 
Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly in-
frastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. 
However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analy-
sis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of 
electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity dis-
tribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance func-
tion models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorpo-
rating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension 
into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to 
previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical effi-
ciency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality 
of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise 
that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and 
incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market 
concentration in regulated natural monopolies. 
Keywords: efficiency, quality of service, scale economies, input distance 
function, stochastic frontier analysis. 
JEL: L15, L51, L94 
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1. Introduction 
Infrastructure industries, such as electricity, telecommunications, gas, transport, and wa-
ter continue to maintain their strategic importance in modern economies. Since the 
1990s, the globally dominant paradigms governing the structure and ownership models 
of these industries, natural monopoly, vertical integration, and public ownership, have 
been challenged. Liberal models based on competition, economic incentives, and pri-
vate ownership have been adopted to achieve internal and external efficiency improve-
ments in these sectors and to benefit customers in the form of lower costs and higher 
service quality. 
 
The electricity sector has witnessed considerable liberalisation activities in many coun-
tries around the world. The main tenets of electricity sector liberalisation have been re-
structuring, regulation, and privatization. Implementing the new model required restruc-
turing of the industries to separate potentially competitive segments (generation and re-
tail supply) from natural monopoly activities (distribution and transmission) that would 
need to be regulated. Independent regulation would oversee the successful functioning 
of competitive power markets and regulated transmission and distribution networks. 
Private ownership and profit incentive would promote internal efficiency in the firms. 
Moreover, two important aspects of the new industry structure have been widely ne-
glected: the question of (efficient) optimal firm size in natural monopolies and its rela-
tion to quality of service (QoS). 
 
In competitive markets, competition and market size are important determinants of firm 
size and market concentration (subject to rules and policy). In natural monopolies, in 
the absence of market forces, public intervention, regulation, and history are often fac-
tors that affect efficiency and scale of firms. Theory characterises natural monopolies to 
be the most technically efficient market structure when a single firm can produce a spe-
cific output vector at less cost than two or more firms (subadditivity). Subadditive cost 
structures have been theoretically and empirically shown in networks of infrastructure 
industries (e.g. Gilsdorf, 1995 and Salvanes and Tjøtta, 1998). However, the appropriate 
scale (of production) of natural monopolies is also of economic interest. Optimal firm 
size as well as technical efficiency is related to the underlying production technology 
and structure of an industry. Therefore, in any given industry, the relationship between 
efficiency and scale is an empirical question. 
 
In the context of European electricity sector reform, the natural monopoly characteris-
tics and economic importance of firm size and quality of service in distribution net-
works has led to public intervention and regulation in these activities. First, at the time 
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of restructuring and unbundling, political decision-makers were faced with decisions 
regarding the number and size of firms. Second, in the post-reform period since the end 
of the 1990s, mergers and acquisitions – vertically and horizontally – increased market 
concentration dramatically and changed the size of the firms requiring an informed pol-
icy towards this development. At the same time, the desirability of having a large num-
ber of utilities in small countries (e.g. Nordic countries) poses an interesting policy 
question. Third, adoption of incentive regulation models in recent years has given rise 
to concerns that, if left unregulated, the pursuit of profit maximisation is likely to result 
in deterioration of quality of service. 
 
In particular, a formal treatment of QoS from an industrial organisation point of view 
and/or as an integrated part of regulatory analysis has been widely neglected. This is es-
pecially problematic as there are interactions and trade-offs between utilities’ costs 
(capital as well as operating and maintenance expenditures) and their size and quality of 
services. A simple cost-only approach to efficiency in regulated utilities will, therefore, 
not take an essential aspect of their activities into account. It is conceivable that quality-
incorporated efficiency and scale measures of firms might differ from those of a cost-
only approach. It is therefore important to enhance understanding of the significance of 
quality of service for efficiency and scale in network industries. Specifically, it might be 
that small operations are justified even where they have high costs but provide higher 
service quality and vice versa. 
 
This paper aims to fill the void in previous research and shed some empirical light on 
the effects of including quality dimensions into the analysis of technical efficiency and 
optimal firm size. We estimate technical efficiency and scale economies of a sample of 
about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries, applying sto-
chastic frontier analysis (SFA) method and multi-output translog input distance function 
models. The outline for the remainder of this paper is as follows. The theoretical foun-
dations and previous literature are presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the meth-
odology, and the estimation method. In Section 4 we introduce the modelling approach 
and specify the estimated models. The data is described in Section 5. Estimation results 
are presented in Section 6. Section 7 contains conclusions and highlights policy impli-
cations and directions for future research. 
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2. Efficiency and Quality of Service 
 
The nature of electricity distribution has been examined in a number of theoretical and 
empirical studies, which predominantly support the existence of natural monopoly con-
ditions in distribution networks.2 This section recapitulates the basic conditions of natu-
ral monopoly theory and reviews previous research on (international) productivity 
analysis, optimal firm size, and on quality of service in network industries. We then pre-
sent two hypotheses regarding the relationship between quality of service, technical ef-
ficiency, and firm size in electricity distribution networks. 
 
The natural monopoly characteristics in electricity distribution can be attributed to three 
major aspects (e.g. Growitsch and Wein 2004): the high degree of sunk investments in 
network assets (e.g. power lines and transformers), economies of scale in electricity 
supply, and economies of scope between the major services in electricity distribution, 
namely ‘customer connection’ and ‘energy delivery’.3 In economic theory, a natural 
monopoly is described as a market structure, where it is technically efficient to produce 
a certain output vector by a single firm. Technically, this condition occurs if the cost 
structure of such a market is strictly and globally subadditive for output vectors Yi, 
i=1,…,m: 
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In the case of a single-product firm, economies of scale (declining average costs) and 
concavity (falling marginal costs) are sufficient conditions for subadditivity and there-
fore existence of natural monopoly.4 Baumol (1977) and Baumol et al. (1982) first dis-
cussed the economic concept of natural monopoly in the context of multi-product indus-
tries. In multi-output settings, economies of scale and the related property of declining-
ray average costs are neither necessary nor sufficient for subadditivity of cost functions. 
Instead, in the multi-output context, subadditivity also requires presence of economies 
                                                 
2 For example, Gilsdorf (1994, 1995), Filippini (1998), Salvanes and Tjøtta (1998), and Yatchew 
(2000). 
3 For a detailed description of outputs in electricity distribution, see Section 4. 
4 Sharkey (1982) presents numerous examples of subadditive cost functions to illustrate that neither 
economies of scale nor concavity are necessary conditions for subadditivity. As the existence of 
natural monopoly conditions in electricity distribution is an established notion, we are going to con-
centrate on more straightforward calculations rather than hypothetical exceptions. 
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of joint production, either in the form of cost complementarity or trans-ray convexity.5 
Cost complementarity holds if inequality 1 is true for incremental as well as for total 
costs (Sharkey, 1982). Figure 1 illustrates the concept of transray convexity (here: in 
connection with economies of scale both in separate and joint production of outputs Y1 
and Y2). A cost function C for two outputs Y1 and Y2 satisfies the property of transray 
convexity at a point Y if a line through Y shows a negative slope proving economies of 
joint production. The joint production cost function C(Y1+Y2) in Figure 1 is also con-
cave along all rays through the origin, indicating additional economies of scale. Being 
concave and transray convex, the illustrated cost function satisfies sufficient conditions 
of subadditivity. 
 
Figure 1: Subadditivity in the two-output case 
 
 
Applying the concept of multi-output production in natural monopolies to electricity 
distribution we focus on analysis of multi-product economies of scale (which is equiva-
lent to identifying concavity of the joint cost function in Figure 1), testing for existence 
of economies of joint production, namely economies of scope (which is transray con-
vexity in Figure 1). This is appropriate, as the aim of this study is to examine optimal 
utility/service size and the natural monopoly characteristics of electricity distribution 
                                                 
5 See Baumol (1977) and Baumol et al. (1982) for a detailed description of these concepts and suffi-
cient conditions for natural monopolies. 
Y1 
Y2 
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networks are well-established. Although, there is ample evidence that there is consider-
able variation in efficiency of distribution utilities (e.g. IPART 1999, Jamasb and Pollitt 
2003), the effects of size and quality of service on efficient operation and performance 
of these utilities is less clear. 
 
The reviewed literature points to different economic and methodological aspects that 
are related to the subject matter of this paper. First, a branch of studies has focused on 
international comparisons of network industries including electricity distribution. Sec-
ond, there is a line of literature that analyses most productive scale size in electricity 
distribution. Third, a limited body of literature has addressed the issue of quality of ser-
vice aspect in network industries. 
 
Academic research and, to a lesser extent, regulation has used cross-country efficiency 
analyses partly to overcome problems due to a small number of observations, cross-
border mergers, or/and the possibility of collusion among the regulated companies (Ja-
masb and Pollitt, 2003; Estache et al., 2004). Regulatory use of efficiency analysis has 
largely been limited to single country analysis. Cross-country studies of the perform-
ance of electric utilities are, however, rather few. In a comparison of UK and US distri-
bution utilities, Pollitt (1995) finds a comparable performance in both countries. IPART 
(1999), in a study for the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal in Australia fo-
cuses primarily on Australian distribution companies, taking UK and New Zealand utili-
ties as additional observations. In another comparison of seven Australian and 32 inter-
national electricity utilities Whiteman (1995) uses an international reference set to ana-
lyse the development of X-inefficiency in Australian electricity utilities. 
 
In a comparison of Scandinavian and Dutch electricity distribution companies, Edvard-
sen and Førsund (2003) show the advantage of international comparisons in identifying 
peer companies. Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) compare the efficiency of 63 distribution 
utilities from six European countries using parametric and non-parametric benchmark-
ing methods. They find that efficiency results tend to be rather sensitive in level, al-
though not in rank order. Additionally, they report methods of introducing comparabil-
ity in international samples. Analysing panel data of 84 South American electricity dis-
tributors from eight countries, Estache et al. (2004) point out the importance of interna-
tional benchmarking and the coordination of regulators in order to reduce information 
asymmetries. In a recent study, Hattori et al. (2005) analyse the efficiency development 
of UK and Japanese distribution utilities using panel data from 1985-1998, reporting an 
acceleration of productivity growth over time and positive economies of scale for UK 
companies relative to Japanese firms. 
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Previous research on scale economies and optimal firm size commonly applies the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique to calculate the scale efficiency by comparing 
the efficiency results from constant and variable returns to scale models.6 Empirical re-
sults from parametric models tend to be rather few and predominantly applied cost func-
tions for the analysis. For electricity distribution, an early contribution was by Nerlove 
(1963), who applies a cost function based on a generalized Cobb-Douglas production 
function and gives evidence for the possibility of substitution among factors of produc-
tion. In two studies of Swiss electricity distribution utilities, Filippini (1996) and 
Filipinni and Wild (2001) using a flexible translog and a linear average cost function 
find evidence of increasing returns to scale throughout their sample of 39 and 59 utili-
ties respectively. 
 
Other studies address the issue of minimum efficient scale size. Giles and Wyatt (1993) 
estimate a total cost function from a sample of 60 New Zealand electricity distributors, 
reporting an efficient scale for a sales range of 500 to 3500 GWh. Yatchew (2000) con-
verted the results from Giles and Wyatt on a number of customer basis and reports a 
minimum efficient scale size at 30000 customers. Salvanes and Tjøtta (1994) in a cross-
sectional analysis of 100 Norwegian electricity distribution utilities find an optimal firm 
size at about 20,000 customers and that is relatively independent from the GWh sales. 
These results confirm Yatchew’s (2000) findings based on a four-year panel of 81 Ca-
nadian distributors. The study estimated a semi-parametric translog cost function and 
reports substantial scale economies and a minimum efficient scale achieved by firms 
with about 20000 customers. 
 
Empirical research on quality of service in network industries is scarce and mostly con-
centrated on telecommunications sector (Resende and Façanha 2004, Sappington 2002, 
Ai and Sappington 1998; Kridel et al. 1996). For the electricity sector, Ter-Martirosyan 
(2003) analyses the effect of incentive regulation on duration and frequency of electric 
outages for a panel of 78 U.S. utilities, reporting an increase in the duration of outages 
associated with incentive regulation. The study also finds that outages decrease when 
explicit quality benchmarks are introduced. Korhonen and Syrjänen (2003) find im-
provement in technical efficiency after incorporating quality of service (interruption 
time per customer) in their DEA analysis of 106 Finish distribution utilities. CEPA 
(2003) applies a two step DEA model to cross-sectional data for the UK and finds no 
significant correlation between technical efficiency measures and service quality in 
                                                 
6 For an introduction see Coelli et al. (1998). 
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terms of minutes lost per customer. Ajodhia et al. (2004) apply a DEA and a Corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) model to a cross-sectional sample of 44 electric utili-
ties from four countries (UK, Netherlands, Hungary and Malaysia), reporting a signifi-
cant efficiency increase when quality is taken into account especially for smaller utili-
ties. Giannakis et al. (2005) carried out a quality incorporated efficiency study with 
panel data on UK electricity distribution. They show that technical efficiency does not 
necessarily also involve high service quality and state that quality incorporated regula-
tory benchmarking is superior to cost-only approaches. 
 
The relationship of efficiency, firm size, and quality in regulated network industries has 
not been addressed previously. Kwoka (2005) is an exception, who in an analysis of pri-
vate and public U.S. electric utilities estimates a quadratic cost function and reports 
lower distribution costs and higher quality in terms of lower duration of interruptions 
for smaller (public) companies. However, he did not apply frontier analysis and was not 
able to measure individual company efficiency. 
 
Our review of natural monopoly theory and previous studies on electricity distribution 
suggests that important aspects of industry structure have not been addressed. The first 
issue is the relationship between technical efficiency and firm size. Insofar as econo-
mies of scale exist, larger firms are expected to demonstrate higher technical efficiency 
ceteris paribus. This relationship also applies to economies of scope between outputs 
(e.g. customer numbers and energy supplied). Natural monopoly theory would then 
suggest increasing service area size until scale economies are exploited. 
 
Inclusion of the quality dimension into technical efficiency analysis might alter the op-
timal firm size. Kwoka presents the hypothesis, that smaller utilities supply higher qual-
ity, as they have easier access to local market and customer specific information (such 
as demand characteristics and special technical conditions), being important for service 
quality and reliability. Moreover, organizational aspects such as multiple objectives 
combined with observability of results and measurement problems in large firms can 
explain higher quality of service in small firms (Holmström, 1989 and Dixit, 1997). In 
addition, quality criteria are difficult to specify and to enforce (Kwoka, 2005). Also, it 
has been argued that closeness to customer leads to higher quality of service.7 If the 
above proposition holds, incorporating quality of service in electricity distribution utili-
ties’ production function and technical efficiency measurement could reduce economies 
                                                 
7 However, it should be mentioned that some degree of self-selection may exist as small firms with 
low quality of service may have gradually been acquired by larger and more efficient firms. 
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of scale and decrease optimal utility size relative to a pure cost analysis. The following 
two main hypotheses can be drawn: 
(i) In a pure cost efficiency analysis, there are significant economies of scale and 
relative efficiency associated with firm size (‘economies of scale’ hypothesis). 
(ii) The relative cost and efficiency advantage of large firms declines when quality 
of service is taken into account. (‘proximity to customers’ hypothesis). 
 
We test these hypotheses by applying stochastic frontier analysis and distance functions 
to examine the technical efficiency, scale economies and scope economies of electricity 
distribution utilities using a pure cost and combined cost-quality analysis. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Shephard (1953, 1970) proposed the distance function approach for specifying the pro-
duction technology of a multi-output multi-input firm. When analysing regulated indus-
tries this approach has advantages over cost or revenue functions since the behavioural 
assumptions of the latter approaches are likely to be violated (Estache et al., 2004).8 
Distance functions can be differentiated into input and output distance functions. The 
former describes the maximum radial contraction of the input vector while keeping the 
output vector constant. The latter gives information about the maximum producible out-
put given an input vector. For the purpose of this study, we use the input distance func-
tion approach as outputs of electricity distribution networks are exogenously determined 
due to the derived nature of demand (i.e. that is distribution of a given amount of energy 
demanded to a given number of customers) for their output. 
 
The input distance function summarizing all economically relevant characteristics of the 
production technology can be defined as 
DI (X,Y)=max{ρ : (X/ρ) ∈L(Y)} (2) 
where the input set L(Y) represents the set of all input vectors X that can produce out-
puts Y. We assume this production technology satisfies the properties discussed in Färe 
and Primont (1995). From X∈L(Y) follows that DI (X,Y) ≥ 1, equalling unity for any 
company on the frontier of the input set. The input distance function has some addi-
                                                 
8  Estache et al. (2004) refer to a violation of standard assumptions (for example profit maximisation 
or efficient production) in production economics due to regulation and public ownership. 
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tional properties, it is linear homogenous and concave in X. The translog (transcenden-
tal logarithmic) functional form, originally introduced as a cost function model by 
Christensen et al. (1973), has several virtues, which apply to a distance function as well 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The translog input distance function is flexible and al-
lows imposition of assumptions from microeconomic theory such as homogeneity, 
symmetry and monotonicity. 
 
When defined for the case of K inputs and M outputs, the translog input distance func-
tion is specified as 
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with α , β  and δ  being parameters to be estimated and i denoting the ith firm of the 
sample. To impose the properties proposed by microeconomic theory, some constraints 
on the unknown parameters are required. Symmetry is given if the second order coeffi-
cients satisfy 
MmKknmmnlkkl ,...,2,1 and ,...,2,1for   and  ==== ααββ . (4) 
The restrictions required for homogeneity of degree + 1 in inputs are 
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The monotonicity constraint is satisfied if and only if  
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Based on the above formalisation, it is possible to calculate additional economic charac-
teristics of the corresponding technology. A focal point of this study is the analysis of 
optimal firm size. As shown above, this is related to scale elasticities and returns to 
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scale, which can be obtained from the input distance function as shown by Färe and 
Primont (1995). For the multi-output case, returns to scale can be defined as follows: 
yxyD
RTS I ),(
1
∇
−= . (8) 
where ),( xyID∇  is the vector of first order partial derivatives of the distance function 
with respect to outputs (Rungsuriyawiboon and O’Donnell, 2004). Values of RTS 
greater than one indicate increasing returns to scale, whereas values smaller than one 
imply decreasing returns to scale. The optimal firm size is where RTS equals unity; 
constant returns to scale are a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal scale size 
in electricity distribution. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between scale economies 
and scale efficiency. The latter is, in a parametric setting, equivalent to the ray average 
productivity at the observed input bundle relative to the constant returns to scale input 
vector and differs from the scale economy value except for bundles of constant returns 
to scale (Morrison-Paul et al., 2004).9 We calculate the returns to scale as the negative 
inverse of the scale elasticities: the (negative) scale elasticity is defined as the sum of 
production elasticities: 
ln
ln
I
DIY
mm
D
yε ∂− = − ∂∑ . (9) 
As Morrison-Paul et al. (2004) state, this formula is consistent with Equation 8 and con-
ceptually comparable to the multi-output cost elasticities in Baumol et al. (1982). 
Indeed, this measure of multi-product scale elasticities includes economies of joint pro-
duction. Denny and Pinto (1978) showed that economies of joint production (scope 
economies) exist in translog functions if mnnm ααα <− * . To control for joint produc-
tion effects, we impose the constraint *mn m nα α α= −  into the scale elasticity formula 
and calculate a net scale elasticity measure. Subtracting net scale elasticity from the 
scale elasticity defined in formula 9 gives a measure of economies of scope. 
 
Atkinson and Primont (2002) show that it is possible to calculate ‘implicit input value 
shares’ (Rungsuriyawiboon and O’Donnell, 2004) for any input k by 
ln
ln
I I
k
I
k k
xD D
x xD
∂ ∂=∂ ∂ . (10) 
Ratios of these derivatives can be interpreted as a unit-less rate of input substitution 
(Rungsuriyawiboon and O’Donnell, 2004). 
                                                 
9 See Ray (1999, 2003), Balk (2001), and Orea (2002) for more detailed discussions. 
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In order to estimate firm specific technical efficiency, we apply stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA), originally introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977). SFA is a parametric method which can also estimate an efficient or best 
practice frontier from a distance function model and firm specific deviations (i.e. ineffi-
ciency) from the frontier in the form of technical efficiency scores (see e.g. Coelli et al. 
1998). The estimated technical efficiency scores range between 1 and 0 where a score of 
1 means that a firm is the most efficient in the sample and is on the efficient frontier 
while 0 represents the least efficiency. 
 
Imposing the restrictions specified above, a stochastic frontier model of firm i can be 
modelled as follows (Coelli and Perelman 1999, Rungsuriyawiboon and O’Donnell, 
2004): 
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where α , β  and δ  are unknown parameters, ν is a random error term, and ui = IiDln  
is the (non-negative) technical inefficiency term. The error term ν is distributed as iid 
N(0, σ2), for u we assume a truncated normal distribution N+(m, σ2) as suggested by 
Stevenson (1980). 
 
In order to capture systematic differences in exogenous factors between firms, we also 
include environmental variables to allow variation of a company’s mean efficiency, as-
suming environmental factors directly affecting technical efficiency. As suggested by 
Battese and Coelli (1995), we assume the mean of the truncated normal distributed inef-
ficiency term to be a linear function of environmental variables z (here as country dum-
mies or density factors). For our model, m is specified as: 
0
1
S
i s si
s
m zλ λ
=
= +∑  (12) 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), we estimate the coefficients α , β , δ  and λ  , the 
standard deviations of the error components vu σσ  and , the total error variance 
222
vu σσσ +=  and the ratio of the variance of the inefficiency component to the total 
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error variance 22 σσγ u= . γ  is bounded between zero and unity and indicates the 
relative contribution of inefficiency to total error variance. 
 
The technical efficiency scores are calculated following the procedure by Coelli et al. 
(1999). Technical efficiency for the i-th firm in a set of cross-sectional data is defined 
by: 
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2 2
* (1 )σ γ γ σ= −  (15) 
 
 
4. Modelling Approach and Estimation Strategy 
 
We now turn to the modelling of the electricity distribution technology. First, we spec-
ify the relevant input and output variables for the stochastic frontier model. Second, we 
specify the functional form of the models to be estimated. Concerning the variables, 
previous research on efficiency measurement in electricity distribution has used a vari-
ety of variables and models (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). This may be explained partly by 
lack of data and partly by the nature of issues addressed (Hattori et al., 2005). 
 
In order to estimate relative efficiency and optimal firm size when taking the quality 
dimension into account, we specify two basic models. The first model (Cost-Only) fo-
cuses on efficiency only and consists of one input variable and three output variables. A 
single cost input is used to represent total expenditures (TOTEX) or total cash cost in 
monetary terms defined as the sum of operating expenditures (OPEX) and capital ex-
penditures (CAPEX). While OPEX represents operating and maintenance (O&M) costs, 
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CAPEX represents the annual gross capital outlays of a company. Using a single mone-
tary measure for inputs facilitates international comparison, as it reflects differences in 
relative factor prices and substitution between OPEX and CAPEX among the countries. 
The issues of differences in cost levels, accounting rules, currencies conversion and 
other input level influencing factors will be discussed later. 
 
The second model (Cost-Quality) incorporates quality of service by using the number of 
customer minutes lost (CML) for each firm. CML represents the continuity dimension 
of quality of service, it measures the average duration of outages per connected cus-
tomer and is a proxy for service reliability. Following Yaisawarng and Klein (1994) and 
Giannakis et al. (2005), we treat outage duration as an undesirable input, assuming a 
substitutive relationship between total spending and duration of outages. In an input dis-
tance function model, an efficient firm can reduce CML and cost while maintaining a 
given level of outputs. 
 
Electricity distribution utilities operate in a regulated environment and provide a re-
quired amount of energy to a given number of customers as a joint service. The two 
elements of this service, electricity delivered and number of customers supplied, can be 
treated separately, as they (i) drive different costs, and (ii) interact with each other tech-
nically. Therefore, we use two output variables in the cost-only and the cost-quality 
models. These variables have been identified based on the “separate marketability of 
components” property suggested by Neuberg (1977), that is total number of customers 
and number of energy units supplied measured in Gigawatt-hours (GWh). The two out-
put variables also reflect the structure of a two-part tariff, i.e. a fixed charge per cus-
tomer as well as a variable part dependent on consumed energy. In addition, economies 
of scope between customers and supplied energy have been theoretically identified 
based on advantages in load-management due to a lower risk of stochastic demand ef-
fects (law of large numbers) and the possibility of pooling non-perfectly correlated de-
mands to flatten total demand (Brunekreeft, 2003). These effects gain importance with 
increasing number of customers, relating economies of scope to economies of scale. A 
separate analysis of number of customers and energy units delivered allows the identifi-
cation of economies of scale and scope. 
 
In addition to input and output variables, environmental factors can influence the tech-
nical efficiency of a firm but are beyond managerial control. We use customer density 
(number of customer per network kilometre) as an environmental variable to control for 
density advantages. A set of country dummy variables is used to capture national differ-
ences such as ownership structure, regulation (antitrust rules), different objectives for 
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utilities as well as differences in historical developments regarding size of service area 
and regulation regime. 
 
Since the translog functional form requires an approximation of an underlying function 
to a specific point of the sample, we correct the variables by sample means. This proce-
dure reduces the influence of outliers without affecting the structure of data. In addition, 
the first order coefficients can be interpreted as estimates of production elasticities at 
sample means (Coelli et al. 2003). 
 
For the cost-only model (Model I), the outputs are energy delivered and number of cus-
tomers, and the single input is total expenditures (TOTEX). Inclusion of country dum-
mies as environmental variables allows us to adjust estimates of relative efficiency for 
structural differences which might be attributed to the regulatory regime, historical in-
dustry structure and results of former regulation. Moreover, we control for the differ-
ences in customer density which is expected to have an effect on firm-specific technical 
efficiency. 
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and, 
denscustNethItNoSwFiUKi _0 λλλλλλλλμ +++++++=  (17) 
 
We now extend the discussion to a cost-quality model (Model II), which incorporates 
customer minutes lost as a second input. 
( )
0 1 2
2 2
11 22
12
2
1 11
1 2
ln
ln ln
1 1ln ln
2 2
ln *ln
1ln( ) ln( )
2
ln( )*ln ln( )*ln
i
i i
TOTEX
energy customers
energy customers
energy customers
CML CML
TOTEX TOTEX
CML CMLenergy customers
TOTEX TOTEX
v u
α α α
α α
α
β β
δ δ
− =
+ +
+ +
+
+ +
+ +
+ −
 (18) 
and, 
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denscustNethItNoSwFiUKi _0 λλλλλλλλμ +++++++=  (19) 
Table 1 shows the inputs, outputs, and environmental variables used in our models. 
Table 1: Specification of models 
Variable Model I Model II 
Inputs   
TOTEX √ √ 
CML  √ 
   
Outputs   
No. of customers √ √ 
Units of energy (GWh) √ √ 
   
Environmental Factors (z)   
Country dummies √ √ 
Customer density √ √ 
 
5. Data and Descriptive Information 
The data set used for this study consists of 505 electricity distribution utilities from 
eight European countries, namely Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The data was collected from national regula-
tors and utility associations for the financial year 2002. This section describes in detail 
how the data was harmonized and processed. 
 
Using monetary values of input variables from an international data set bears some 
problems, the most relevant being comparability. As stated in Edvardsen and Førsund 
(2003), the range of practical alternatives for harmonizing is small. We convert the fi-
nancial data to a single monetary unit, the euro, as suggested in Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2003). Five of eight countries in the sample have euro as their common currency. As 
conventional exchange rates do not fully cover country specific differences in price 
level and purchasing power, we adjusted the OPEX and CAPEX with the comparative 
price levels for 2002 using purchasing power parities (OECD 2004). Table 2 shows de-
scriptive information of the data set and the variables. Table 3 describes the variables 
and summary statistics of data used. 
Table 2: Number of utilities in the sample 
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Country Number of utilities 
United Kingdom 14
Ireland 1
Netherlands 7
Finland 100
Norway 145
Sweden 226
Italy 8 Enel departments
Spain 4
 
Total 505
 
Table 3:Variables and summary statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean 
No. of customers 310 5,759,000 136,500 
Energy supplied (GWh) 4,280 48,330,000 1,684,856 
Network length (km) 52 225,299 6,096 
TOTEX 79,140 770,643,600 25,285,020 
CML 0.02 4834.68 123.04 
 
As shown in the Table 2, the number of companies per country varies widely. For the 
UK, Ireland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain, our sample is a near complete inven-
tory count of utilities. For the Netherlands, separate financial data was not available for 
2002 and we aggregated the technical and quality variables at the holding company 
level. Data for Italy’s Enel distribution region information was aggregated from 19 sub-
departments to 8 departments. Despite the data aggregation in both Italy and the Nether-
lands, our data set covers nearly the whole of the national distribution networks. The 
large differences between the minimum and maximum values of variables (Table 3) 
demands interpretation of results with care; on the other hand, it allows an unbiased 
identification of optimal firm size across a wider range. 
 
Concerning our hypotheses, the descriptive statistics show interesting relationships be-
tween costs, firm size, and quality of service. The plot of total expenditures against 
number of customer shows a decreasing increase in costs (Figure 2). On a per customer 
basis, Figure 3 indicates a cost advantage for larger companies, supporting the econo-
mies of scale hypothesis. 
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Figure 2: Total expenses and firm size 
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Figure 3: Total expenses per customer and firm size 
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Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the quality dimension (i.e. customer minute lost) against 
the number of customers as the relevant dimension of firm size. The figure shows that 
smaller firms exhibit a higher degree of service quality, supporting our proximity to 
customer hypothesis. 
 
We controlled the data for outliers by applying the method suggested by Hadi (1992, 
1994), which identifies multiple outliers in multivariate data. For the Model I, 15 obser-
vations were dropped and another 5 observations due to missing data. Data for Model II 
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is adjusted for 34 outliers in total; after dropping 17 observations due to missing data, 
another 17 cases where eliminated based on Hadi’s method.10 
Figure 4: Quality of service and firm size 
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6. Results 
 
In this section we discuss the results of the estimated models, beginning with an analy-
sis of technical efficiency and economies of scale for the cost-only Model I. We then 
extend the discussion to the quality incorporated model Model II. 
 
Analysing the cost-only Model I (Table 4) the following conclusions can be drawn. The 
first order coefficients of ln energy and ln customer are statistically significant and 
show the expected signs. Also, the input TOTEX increases with both increasing energy 
delivered and number of customers. The country dummies and customer density influ-
encing technical efficiency scores produce the following results. Five out of seven 
country variables are significant and can be interpreted as that the dummies for Nordic 
countries are all positive, indicating significant higher technical inefficiency for compa-
nies from Sweden, Norway or Finland. Customer density influences the technical effi-
ciency score as expected, with increasing customer density, technical efficiency scores 
increase as well (to be exact, the negative sign represents a negative effect on ineffi-
                                                 
10 Applying the procedure suggested dropping all observations from Spain. To avoid systematic biases, 
we dropped the Spanish utilities for the cost-only model as well. 
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ciency).11 The monotonicity restriction is not violated and the Wald 2χ  test confirms a 
systematic influence by explanatory variables at 99% level of significance. 
Table 4: Cost-Only Model I 
ln Energy -0.4993*** [-2.79] ln
2σ  -1.037*** [-8.29] 
ln Customer -0.4054** [-2.40] inv log γ 
0.004 
[0.01] 
½ (ln Energy)2 0.4092 [1.50] 
2σ  0.3546 
½ (ln Customer)2 0.4194* [1.69] γ 0.5011 
ln Energy * 
ln Customer 
-0.4138 
[-1.61] 
2
vσ  0.1769 
Constant 0.4383*** [3.72] 
2
uσ  0.1777 
z UK -0.212 [-0.19] Log-likelihood -403.5747 
z Finland 1.613*** [8.45] Wald 
2χ  1476.23 [0.000] 
z Sweden 0.544* [1.69] N 485 
z Norway 1.094*** [4.68]   
z Italy -15.453 [-0.45]   
z Netherlands  1.193*** [2.92]   
z Customer / km -10.547* [-1.83]   
Significant on 10%-. 5%-. and 1%-level: *, **, and ***; z value in parentheses. 
 
The relationship between technical efficiency and utility size in Model I indicates pres-
ence of considerable economies of scale: While the mean technical efficiency score is 
0.45 for small utilities and 0.49 for medium sized utilities respectively, the larger utili-
ties show a mean score of nearly 0.80.12 This relation holds for the different countries 
as well, while the UK (0.84) and Italy (0.82) show very efficient distribution utilities, 
firms from Nordic countries tend to be rather inefficient. An interesting and not ex-
pected result are the comparatively low efficiency scores for Ireland (0.54) and the 
                                                 
11  We suppressed the environmental variables constant to obtain better interpretable results. 
12 This analysis is based on the gross technical efficiency scores (see Coelli, Perelman and Romano 
1999). Calculating net technical efficiency scores as suggested by Coelli et al. reduces the efficiency 
differences between small and large firms but does not alter the relation in general. 
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Netherlands (0.45). However, the confidence intervals of the efficiency scores are large 
and to some extent overlap. This indeed coincides with other research and does not alter 
the results in general.13 
 
Also, returns to scale in relation to number of customers, economies of scale can be 
found throughout the sample. The RTS measure remains constant at about 1.1, which is 
the observed scale economies at the sample mean as well.14 Concerning the issue of op-
timal firm size, these findings suggest that even the largest firms in the sample have not 
exploited all scale economies; a further increase of the joint output vector seems rea-
sonable for the entire sample. 
 
For the Model II with incorporated customer minutes lost as an additional input factor, 
we estimated a two input two-output translog input distance function (Table 5). The first 
order coefficients of ln energy, ln customer, and ln cml (normalized by TOTEX vari-
able) are highly significant and show the expected signs. While total expenditures in-
crease with energy delivered and number of customers, customer minutes lost decrease 
with cost, indicating a trade-off relation between cost and quality. Again, five out of 
seven environmental variables are significantly influencing firm’s technical (in) effi-
ciency.15 The Nordic firms as well as those from the Netherlands are significantly less 
efficient. The control variable for customer density shows a highly significant negative 
relation between number of customers per kilometre of network length and technical in-
efficiency. As in Model I, the monotonicity restriction is not violated. The Wald 2χ  test 
confirms a systematic influence by explanatory variables at 99% level of significance. 
 
The estimated efficiency scores clearly contradict the proximity to customer hypothesis. 
While small firms show the lowest mean efficiency scores (0.38), technical efficiency 
increases to 0.44 for medium sized and 0.81 for large firms.16 Again, this relationship 
                                                 
13 To estimate the confidence intervals of the technical efficiency scores, we applied the procedure 
suggested in Horrace and Schmidt (1996) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). In Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000), formula (3.2.34) contains a typo. We thank William C. Horrace for bringing this to 
our attention. The interested reader may be referred to Horrace and Schmidt (2000). 
14 Applying the procedure of testing for economies of joint production (Denny and Pinto 1978) indi-
cates that this result of constant scale economies throughout the sample cannot be explained by 
scope economies. This seems to be counter-intuitive, as a comparable RTS measure for Model 2 can 
clearly be described by increasing economies of scope with firm size (see below). 
15  Again, we suppressed the environmental variables constant to obtain better interpretable results. 
16 The net technical efficiency scores are less different between small and large firms; but again, this 
relation still holds in general. 
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holds for the countries as well. Italy (0.99) and the UK (0.82) show rather high mean ef-
ficiency scores while Finish (0.22) and Norwegian (0.30) utilities are inefficient on av-
erage. An exception among the Nordic countries is Sweden with a mean quality ad-
justed technical efficiency of the companies of 0.55. In cost-quality terms a compara-
tively inefficient utility can be found in Ireland (0.37), Dutch firms show a mean techni-
cal efficiency of 0.51. As in Model I, the confidence intervals of the technical efficiency 
score are rather large and indicate coincidental differences in technical efficiency to a 
certain extent. 
 25
 
Table 5: Cost-Quality Model II 
ln Energy -0.3944** [-2.51] ln
2σ  -1.262*** [-13.84] 
ln Customer -0.3440** [-2.43] inv log γ 
0.929** 
[2.20] 
½ (ln Energy)2 -0.0483 [-0.18] 
2σ  0.2830 
½ (ln Customer)2 0.2070 [0.90] γ 0.7168 
ln Energy * 
ln Customer 
-0.0685 
[-0.28] 
2
vσ  0.0801 
ln (CML/TOTEX) 0.2764*** [6.12] 
2
uσ  0.2028 
½ (ln CML/TOTEX)2 0.0420*** [4.09] Log-likelihood -333.1597 
ln (CML/TOTEX) * 
ln Energy 
-0.1796*** 
[-3.24] Wald 
2χ  2561.28 [0.000] 
ln (CML/TOTEX) * 
ln Customer 
0.2169*** 
[3.93] N 471 
Constant 0.7067*** [6.79]   
z UK 0.068 [0.09]   
z Finland 1.847*** [12.43]   
z Sweden 0.809*** [4.39]   
z Norway 1.384*** [8.12]   
z Italy -16.234 [-0.36]   
z Netherlands  1.227*** [3.34]   
Significant on 10%-. 5%-. and 1%-level: *, **, and ***; z value in parentheses. 
 
Analysing the returns to scale in relation to number of customers, economies of scale 
can be found throughout the sample with RTS at about 1.2 on average. Testing for 
economies of joint production (Denny and Pinto 1978) shows decreasing net returns to 
scale as well as increasing economies of scope with firm size. Net returns to scale are 
homogenously decreasing throughout the sample, scale economies can be found for 
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utilities below 183,000 customers (see Figure 5, dark squares).17 We calculated positive 
scope economies for utilities with more than 108,000 customers (Figure 5, light trian-
gles).18 These findings support the assumed relation of energy supplied and number of 
customers: At a certain utility size, stochastic scale advantages or positive effects of 
pooling demand seem to develop. Our findings emphasize that the existence of scale re-
lated scope economies drive optimal firm size. Indeed, gross RTS scores above one for 
even the largest companies militate for an optimal utility size beyond the maximum ob-
served number of customers in our sample. This result has to be treated with care as it is 
sensitive to the curvature of our estimated function. Nevertheless, for the given data set 
the results are viable. 
Figure 5: Net RTS, scope economies, and number of customers 
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The relationship between the two inputs total expenditures and customer minutes lost, 
indicates that the ratio of the CML elasticity to the TOTEX elasticity increases with 
firm size (Figure 6). This measure of factor substitutability indicates that large utilities 
might be technically better able to increase quality of service at a given output level (by 
increasing total costs) while small utilities cannot substitute total expenses against qual-
ity to such an extent. 
                                                 
17 We obtained this result be estimating a logged trend function in a scatter plot diagram of returns to 
scale and number of customers, setting the trend equation to one and solving for the number of cus-
tomers (R2 = 0.2317). 
18 This result was obtained by estimating a logged trend function in a scatter plot diagram of econo-
mies of scope and number of customers, setting the trend equation to one and solving for the number 
of customers (R2 = 0.2477). 
 27
Figure 6: Input substitution and firm size - Model II 
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Comparing and recapitulating the results from Models I and II, empirical evidence 
clearly supports the economies of scale hypothesis. In both the pure and the quality ad-
justed model, technical efficiency increases with firm size. Additionally, the efficiency 
differences are rather substantial. The efficiency differences in relation to firm size re-
flect the differences across countries as well. Countries with large utilities such as Italy 
and the UK show considerably higher mean technical efficiency scores than countries 
with smaller companies as the Nordic countries. 
 
An interesting and somewhat unexpected result is that the proximity to the customer 
hypothesis can be rejected with confidence; empirical observations even give evidence 
to the contrary (Table 6). While incorporating quality of service increases average tech-
nical efficiency of large firms (and countries with predominantly large firms), efficiency 
of small firms decreases substantially. Regressing the (logged) TE scores of Model II by 
those of Model I clearly support this finding; the TE scores are significantly negatively 
correlated, correlation is around -0.96. 
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Table 6: Comparison of technical efficiency of Models I and II 
 Model Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average 
Change 
Cost-only TE 0.4503 0.1722 0.1129 0.9255 
Small firms* 
Cost-quality TE  0.3765 0.1768 0.0591 0.8193 
 
-16.40% 
Cost-only TE 0.4926 0.2004 0.1234 0.9885 
Medium firms* 
Cost-quality TE  0.4352 0.2176 0.0946 0.9868 
 
-11.66% 
Cost-only TE 0.7963 0.1985 0.3380 0.9894 
Large firms* 
Cost-quality TE  0.8106 0.1788 0.3661 0.9891 
 
1.80% 
Cost-only TE 0.8353 0.0274 0.7727 0.8854 
UK 
Cost-quality TE  0.8191 0.0658 0.6350 0.9106 
 
-1.94% 
Cost-only TE 0.2507 0.1164 0.1129 0.7922 
Finland 
Cost-quality TE  0.2222 0.1345 0.0738 0.8883 
 
-11.39% 
Cost-only TE 0.6189 0.1235 0.1281 0.9255 
Sweden 
Cost-quality TE  0.5523 0.1659 0.0591 0.8671 
 
-10.76% 
Cost-only TE 0.5381 0.0000 0.5381 0.5381 
Ireland 
Cost-quality TE  0.3661 0.0000 0.3661 0.3661 
 
-31.96% 
Cost-only TE 0.3782 0.0549 0.2647 0.5516 
Norway 
Cost-quality TE  0.3008 0.0676 0.1749 0.5472 
 
-20.46% 
Cost-only TE 0.8169 0.0265 0.7720 0.8436 
Italy 
Cost-quality TE  0.9891 0.0003 0.9885 0.9894 
 
21.07% 
Cost-only TE 0.4445 0.1058 0.3380 0.5951 Netherlands 
  Cost-quality TE  0.5123 0.1143 0.3355 0.6477 
 
15.26% 
* Small firms are defined as being part of the 50% percentile of number of customers, medium firm are within the 
50% to 95% percentile, large firms are the largest 5%. 
 
Figure 7 visualizes the differences in level and distribution of TE scores between Mod-
els I and II. The scatter plots of technical efficiency and number of customers show size 
advantages for both models; the distribution of the scores however is different. In 
Model I, the scores are less dispersed and the average technical efficiency is slightly 
higher. The scatter plot of Model II supports the results shown in Table 6. While small 
and especially less efficient firms seem to suffer from the inclusion of service quality 
into the analysis, large and efficient firms seem to benefit in terms of efficiency scores. 
This result shows, illustrated in Figure 6, that large firms can supply quality at lower 
cost. 
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Figure 7: Technical efficiency and firm size - Models I and II 
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7. Conclusions 
 
Our analysis of the relationship between firm size, technical efficiency, and quality of 
service for European electricity distribution utilities shows evidence of significant 
economies of scale in electricity distribution networks. In addition, we found economies 
of scope between energy delivered and number of customers can be observed among 
larger firms. 
 
Concerning quality of service and firm size, the results are ambiguous: our descriptive 
results indicate that small firms perform better in terms of quality of service. Since pro-
vision of quality is related to level of costs, this finding alone is not conclusive; the 
cost-quality models revealed that large utilities are technically more efficient even when 
quality is controlled for, indicating that larger firms can supply a given level of quality 
of service at lower cost. Therefore, the hypothesis of customer proximity was rejected. 
 
Regarding natural monopoly theory, the “proper” size of the natural monopoly utility 
does not appear to be affected when quality is incorporated in the analysis. Our analysis 
of the mean technical efficiency of utilities confirms the findings on firm size; we found 
significant differences among the countries and showed that smaller utilities and coun-
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tries with smaller firms (i.e. Nordic utilities) tend be significantly less efficient than 
large utilities from, for example, Italy or the UK. Additionally, the relationship between 
input elasticities (factor substitution) indicates that larger companies might, in contrast 
to small utilities, be able to increase quality more easily by increasing total expenses. 
These findings contradict previous studies on optimal utility size, such as Yatchew 
(2000) and Salvanes and Tjøtta (1994). While they found optimal size at a rather low 
scale; our analysis shows unexploited scale economies throughout the sample, indicat-
ing that utility size should be increased further even for large companies. These differ-
ences might be explained by basically three different factors. First, our analysis is based 
on a significantly larger sample with a broader range of firms. Second, in contrast to 
those previous studies, our sample includes a variety of comparably very large firms. 
And third, the positive scale ecnomies throughout the sample can be explained by the 
relationship of firm size and economies of scope between number of customers and de-
livered energy, which has not been analysed in detail before. 
 
The policy implications from our study are threefold. First, the possibility of factor sub-
stitution indicates the option of an increase in quality of service when appropriately 
regulated especially in countries with large utilities. This might diminish the current 
quality advantages of small utilities. Second, countries with a large number of small 
utilities should allow mergers in order to exploit potential gains. Third, in order to avoid 
collusion among utilities against regulatory agencies, we suggest a European harmoni-
sation of data definition and collection and regulatory accounts to facilitate international 
comparisons and benchmarking. 
 
Future research on technical efficiency, firm size and quality of service in network in-
dustries in general and electricity distribution in particular should address the issue of 
productivity development over time. This would require panel data analysis to control 
for cyclical effects and to overcome the shortcomings of cross-sectional analyses. An-
other important aspect, not addressed in this study, is the relationship between effi-
ciency, quality, and ownership structure. Publicly owned utilities may, due to differing 
managerial or corporate objectives, exhibit different performance in terms of efficiency 
from private companies. Finally, the socio-economic costs of outages as well as the cost 
of quality improvement need to be incorporated in the analysis in order to improve in-
centive regulation schemes for quality of service. 
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